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Appellant/Respondent. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
This case deals with a statutory motor vehicle dealer 
bond. The issue requires deciding whether a mobile home is a 
motor vehicle as that term is defined by the applicable 
statute. The applicable statute was amended after the initial 
briefs were filed. The issue raised by this supplemental brief 
is whether the addition of mobile homes to the definition of a 
motor vehicle indicates that mobile homes were not included in 
the definition of a motor vehicle prior to the amendment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The 1987 Utah Legislature amended Title 41, Chapter 3 
of the Utah Code and added mobile homes to the prior definition 
of a motor vehicle. Senate Bill No. 63, Utah Legislative 
Report (1987). 
2. "Motor vehicle" was previously defined as follows: 
"Motor Vehicle" means vehicle intended primarily for 
use and operation on the public highways which is 
self-propelled; a vehicle intended primarily for 
operation on the public highways which is not driven 
or propelled by its own power, but which is designated 
either to be attached to or become part of, or to be 
drawn by a self-propelled vehicle; but not including 
farm tractors and other machines and tools used in the 
production, harvesting and care of farm products. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-7 (1986, before amendment). 
3. * As amended by Senate Bill No. 63, "motor vehicle" is 
now defined as follows: 
"Motor Vehicle" means a vehicle intended primarily for 
the use and operation on the public highways, and 
which is self-propelled; a vehicle intended primarily 
for operation on the public highways which is not 
driven or propelled by its own power, but which is 
designated either to be attached to and become a part 
of, or to be drawn by a self-propelled vehicle; 
including mobile homes, but not including farm 
tractors and other machines and tools used in the 
production, harvesting, and care for farm products. 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-3-7 (1987) (Emphasis added). 
4. The only change to the statute is the addition of 
"including mobile homes." 
-?-
ARGUMENT 
THE ADDITION OF MOBILE HOMES TO THE 
DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLES INDICATES THAT 
MOBILE HOMES WERE NOT INCLUDED BEFORE THE 
AMENDMENT. 
The objectives of Senate Bill 63 included broadening the 
definition of an automobile dealer. Utah Senate Debate; Second 
Reading of Senate Bill 63; February 9, 1987; Day 29; 47th 
Legislature (Recording on file at Utah Senate Office). The 
addition of mobile homes to the definition of motor vehicles 
indicates that the law was expanded to include mobile homes and 
therefore dealers of mobile homes. 
"When a statute is amended it is presumed that the 
legislature intended the statute to have a different meaning 
from the meaning accorded the statute before amendment." In 
Interest of Miller, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968, 969 (1986); 
Accord, Bauman v. Crawford, 104 Wash. 2d 241, 704 P.2d 1181, 
1185 (1985); In Re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 753, 
210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985); Broussau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 
453, 675 P.2d 713, 715 (1984); State v. Duvish, 234 Kan. 708, 
675 P.2d 877, 883 (1984); Foster v. Kovich, 673 P.2d 1239, 1243 
(Mont. 1983). Courts have also concluded that M[f]rom the 
addition of words it may be presumed that the legislature 
intended some changes in the existing law . . . .M Tec America 
v. DeKalb City Board of Tax Assessors, 170 Ga. App. 533, 317 
-3-
S.E. 2d 637, 641 (1984) (quoting, C. W. Matthews Contracting 
Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, 149 Ga. App. 354, 254 S.E.2d 
426 (1979)). 
Presumably by the addition of mobile homes to the 
definition of a motor vehicle the Legislature intended to 
change the existing law. This was the only change made to the 
statute. The presumption is stronger in the case of an 
isolated, independent amendment. Board of Educ. of Unified 
School Dist. v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 231 Kan. 731, 648 
P.2d 1143, 1147 (1982). 
The recent addition of mobile homes to the definition of 
motor vehicles confirms Ohio Casualty's previous argument that 
mobile homes were not included in the old definition of motor 
vehicles. 
The Legislature has now decided that mobile home buyers 
should have the same protection as automobile buyers but that 
protection was not provided by the old statute under which this 
case arose. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons as well as those stated in Ohio 
Casualty's initial briefs, Ohio Casualty respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the ruling of the lower court and rule 
that Ohio Casualty is not liable to Shelter America in any 
amount. 
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